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The social Simon effect (SSE) occurs if two participants share a Simon task by making a Go/
No-Go response to one of two stimulus features. If the two participants perform this version 
of the Simon task together, a Simon effect occurs (i.e., performance is better with spatial 
stimulus–response correspondence), but no effect is observed if participants perform the task 
separately. The SSE has been attributed to the automatic co-representation of the co-actor’s 
actions, which suggests that it relies on online information about the other’s actions. To test 
this implication, we investigated whether the SSE varies with the presence and amount of 
online action-related feedback from the other person. Experiment 1 replicated the SSE with 
auditory stimuli. Experiment 2, in which participants were blindfolded, demonstrated that visual 
feedback from the other’s actions is not necessary for the SSE to occur. Experiment 3 replicated 
Experiment 2 with a regular and a soundless keyboard. A comparable SSE was obtained in 
both conditions, suggesting that even auditory online input from the other’s actions is not 
necessary. Taken together, our data suggest that the SSE does not rely on online information 
about the co-actor’s actions but that a priori offline information about another actor’s presence 
is sufficient to generate the effect.
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stems from the so-called “Social Simon paradigm,” in which two 
persons share a Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003). In the standard 
Simon task, single participants carry out left and right responses to 
a non-spatial attribute of stimuli that appear randomly on the left 
or right side. The standard finding in this task is that participants 
perform better if the stimulus happens to appear on the side of 
the correct response than if it does not (Simon and Rudell, 1967). 
Sebanz et al. (2003) had two participants share this task, so that 
each participant responded to only one of the stimuli by pressing a 
single key, which from the perspective of each participant rendered 
the task a Go/No-Go task. While performing this Go/No-Go version 
alone did not elicit a Simon effect, working on the task together 
with a co-actor did. This shared-task effect has been called the social 
Simon effect (SSE; Sebanz et al., 2003).
The SSE suggests that action or task representations are grounded 
not only in the experience of one’s own actions but that they can 
also include aspects of the current social or at least situational 
context (Hommel et al., 2009), which seems to imply that action 
planning is truly situated (Clancey, 1997). Given that we are social 
animals used to act in social context, which often requires the 
consideration of other people’s activities, this may not come as a 
surprise. However, the cognitive mechanisms responsible for inte-
grating information about the current action context are not very 
well understood. According to Sebanz et al. (2003), the SSE might 
suggest that people do not only create cognitive representations of 
their own actions but they may also automatically co-represent the 
actions of a co-actor. In particular, Sebanz et al. (2003)  suggest that 
IntroductIon
Humans are active agents who organize their behavior according 
to their plans and action goals. However, where those plans and 
goals come from and how they are acquired is not very well under-
stood. According to the ideomotor approach to voluntary action 
(Lotze, 1852; James, 1890; for an overview, see Stock and Stock, 
2004), actions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory 
consequences, so that the acquisition of action plans amounts to 
the experience-driven integration of motor patterns with codes of 
their sensory effects (Elsner and Hommel, 2001). Indeed, numer-
ous studies have provided evidence that performing a movement 
creates associations between the underlying motor pattern and the 
sensory consequences that go along with executing this pattern (for 
an overview, see Hommel, 2009). This implies that our cognitive 
action representations are grounded in sensory experience, that is, 
in the perceptual consequences a given action was experienced to 
create. According to ideomotor theory, this perceptual grounding 
provides us with the means to carry out movements intentionally: 
we internally re-create the sensory experience of the action effects 
to some degree (in other words, we anticipate them) and thereby 
reactivate the associated motor pattern that will then produce the 
anticipated effects in the external world (Elsner and Hommel, 2001; 
Hommel, 2009).
Recent research has raised the possibility that action represen-
tations do not only comprise of information about the sensory 
consequences of one’s own action but that information about other 
people’s actions might also be considered. Most of this research 
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whether this would reduce or even eliminate the effect. Experiment 





Forty participants (20 male), aged 18–30 (average age: 24.8) were 
randomly selected from the database of the Max Planck Institute. 
All participants read and signed an informed consent form for 
behavioral experiments before being registered into the database. 
All subjects were right handed (tested according to Oldfield, 1971), 
had normal or corrected to normal vision and had normal hearing. 
The subjects were invited as pairs and were asked beforehand if they 
were already acquainted with one another before the testing day. 
Acquainted participants could not participate together, and were 
rescheduled with new co-actors in order to keep a priori knowledge 
of the task and the co-actor as constant as possible for all pairs. Each 
participant performed a Single Go/No-Go task, a Joint Go/No-Go 
task (i.e., the Social Simon task) and a standard (solo) Simon task. 
Each task comprised of the same auditory stimuli. Each participant 
received 10.50 € for their participation.
Materials
The auditory stimuli consisted of human vocal utterances with-
out any semantic meaning in German, the testing language. The 
sounds were originally generated for a functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging study (Henk van Steenbergen, unpublished). We 
used the reversed and compressed Dutch words “groen” (green) 
and “paars” (purple) spoken by different male actors and processed 
using Adobe Audition 2.0 – which resulted in stimuli sounding 
like “oerg” and “chap.” The sounds were adjusted to equal lengths 
of 300 ms and presented with a loudness of approximately 60 dB. 
Two loudspeakers were placed 50 cm to the left and right from the 
middle of a computer screen. Response buttons were placed 25 cm 
away from the computer screen, 30 cm apart from each other.
Study design and procedure
A 2 (congruent, incongruent) × 2 (Go, No-Go) × 3 (Single, Joint, 
Standard) factorial design was used. There were 64 trials per design 
cell for the Single Go/No-Go and the Standard Simon task, and 
128 trials per cell for the Joint Go/No-Go task. To keep track of the 
performance, a feedback screen was presented after half of the trials 
in each condition. The feedback showed the average reaction times 
(RTs) and percentage correct (PC), which in the Joint condition 
referred to the mean performance across both participants. The 
task was preceded by a training phase of 25 trials per cell.
The two auditory stimuli “oerg” and “chap” were assigned to 
the left and right button, respectively. In the Joint condition, one 
participant responded to the “oerg” sound with the left button 
and was thus seated on the left side while the other participant 
responded to the “chap” sound and was seated on the right side 
(see Figure 1).
Each trial began with a warning signal, a 300 ms beep pre-
sented through both loudspeakers (symbolized by the fixation 
mark in Figure 2). After a silent period of 700 ms, the stimulus 
tone appeared for 300 ms through the left or right loudspeaker. 
the effect may arise at a representational level that does not distin-
guish between one’s own and another person’s actions. According 
to the ideomotor principle (Hommel, 2009), both types of actions 
are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory consequences, 
which might imply that sensory feedback from both one’s own and 
the co-actor’s actions is crucial for the SSE to occur. Alternatively, 
it might be that it is not the other person’s action that matters the 
mere possibility of acting might suffice. If so, an actor should show 
a SSE even if he or she is unable to perceive the co-actors action 
and continuously monitor his or her presence.
In an auditory version of the Simon task, Ruys and Aarts (2010) 
provided actors with relatively constant (online) sensory informa-
tion about the co-actor’s presence by presenting them with colored-
light flashes that signaled the co-actor’s responses. Even though 
actors could not see their co-actor, a full-blown SSE was obtained. 
This outcome demonstrates that it is not the shared presence in 
the same room that is important for the SSE, but it fails to clarify 
whether the SSE was due to the sensory feedback about the co-
actor’s actions or the mere belief that one is collaborating with 
someone else.
One problem with comparing physical acting with virtual co-
acting is that this comparison confounds a number of potentially 
important factors, such as instructions and the availability of sen-
sory cues. In an attempt to control for the latter, Sebanz et al. (2003) 
had participants wear earplugs and prevented them from seeing the 
other person’s hand, which did not reduce the SSE. However, the co-
actor was still clearly visible as was his/her involvement in the task, 
which does not render this manipulation particularly strong.
Two recent studies investigated the contributions of online ver-
sus offline information more systematically by providing knowl-
edge about a second actor who was said to work on the same task 
in a different room (Welsh et al., 2007; Tsai et al., 2008). However, 
while Tsai and colleagues showed clear evidence for effects of 
offline information (i.e., a SSE was obtained in the physical absence 
of the co-actor) Welsh and colleagues did not, which renders the 
evidence equivocal. For evaluating this discrepancy it is informa-
tive to consider the set-up of the tasks. Tsai et al. (2008) invited 
participants who were already acquainted with one another prior 
to the testing day and allowed them to communicate via intercom 
before the task and during the break. In contrast, in the study of 
Welsh et al. (2007) the experimenter was the co-actor, who did not 
remind the actor of their interaction after having left the room. 
In other words, the actor’s belief that the co-actor would still col-
laborate with him/her was not updated. It could thus be that offline 
information about the co-actor is not sufficient to establish the SSE 
if it is not constantly updated by online information. Therefore 
it is still not clear what role online information of the co-actor 
plays in the SSE.
In the present study, we controlled for previous acquaintance 
with the co-actor and made an attempt to manipulate the avail-
ability of sensory feedback about the other in a more systematic 
fashion. To increase control over perceptual cues, we used an audi-
tory version of the social Simon task. Experiment 1 established 
this auditory version and was expected to replicate the standard 
SSE in the auditory domain in accordance with Ruys and Aarts 
(2010). Experiment 2 included a blindfold condition that elimi-
nated all action-related visual information about the other, to see 
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participants sat in the same room, side by side, and on the same 
side as in the Single and Standard conditions. In the Joint condi-
tion, each participant responded to the same sound as in the Single 
condition. In the Standard condition, participants sat in separate 
rooms and responded to both sounds, but still sat on the same 
side as in the other two conditions. The order of Single and Joint 
condition was counterbalanced. The Standard task was presented 
last as a control condition.
rEsults
All analyses were tested with an alpha of 0.05. The error rate was 
very low (Single = 0.5%, Joint = 0.6%, Standard = 3.8%) and error 
trials were excluded from analyses. The median RTs per partici-
pant for correct responses were entered into a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA, with Type of task (Single Go/No-Go, Joint Go/
No-Go, Standard Simon) and Congruency (congruent, incongruent) 
as independent factors (for average RTs see Table 1). There was a 
main effect of Congruency (F(1,39) = 95.72, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.711); 
responses were slower in incongruent than in congruent trials 
(M = 330, SE = 9.8, and M = 312, SE = 9.0 respectively). The main 
effect of Type of task was not significant but the interaction between 
Congruency and Type of task was (p < 0.001). Paired-samples tests 
between congruent and incongruent trials revealed a significant con-
gruency effect in the Standard (t(39) = 14.48, p < 0.001) and the Joint 
condition (t(39) = 6.04, p < 0.001), but not in the Single condition 
(t(39) = −0.51, p = 0.61). Given that the Joint condition comprised 
of twice as  many trials as the other two conditions, we re-analyzed 
the data by considering only the first 64 trials per cell of the Joint 
condition, but the outcome was the same.
The trial ended after the response was emitted but no later than 
3000 ms after stimulus onset. The next trial began after another 
blank interval of 1000 ms.
The (social) Simon effect was measured by subtracting RTs 
for incongruent trials (no correspondence of stimulus location 
and response) from RTs for congruent trials (correspondence of 
stimulus location and response). Each participant performed the 
task under three conditions. In the Single condition, participants 
carried out the task alone in a separate room, sitting on one side 
and only responding to one sound. In the Joint condition, two 
Figure 1 | Design of the social Simon task. The example shows a stimulus–location–congruent response (top panels) and an incongruent response (bottom 
panels) for the left and right located actor (left and right column, respectively).
Figure 2 | Timing and sequence of events in experiment 1.
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as within-subjects factor and the independent variable Visual 
Feedback (present, absent) as between-subjects factor. There was a 
main effect of Congruency (F(1,38) = 122.55, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.76); 
responses were slower in incongruent than in congruent trials 
(M = 306, SE = 7.9, and M = 284, SE = 7.2 respectively). There was 
neither a main effect of Visual Feedback (F(1,38) = 0.07, p = 0.8, 
η2 = 0.002), nor a significant interaction (F(1,38) = 1.04, p = 0.314, 
η2 = 0.03), suggesting that the Simon effects were equivalent in the 
two conditions (Table 2).
dIscussIon
There was no evidence whatsoever that eliminating visual online 
feedback about the co-actor reduced or eliminated the SSE – the 
numerical effect was even larger in the absence of visual informa-
tion. Given that participants were blindfolded even during the 
training phase, each participant had only very little information 
about the co-actor’s actions to improve on that during the task. 
This suggests that action and task representations do not rely 
on online information, but on a priori knowledge (offline infor-
mation) to interact with a social, intentional interaction part-
ner. However, in Experiment 2 auditory action-related online 
information from the button presses may have established the 
SSE in the blindfold condition, an issue that we addressed in 
Experiment 3.
ExpErImEnt 3
Although participants in Experiment 2 were prevented from 
processing visual online feedback, they did have access to auditory 
online feedback. Both co-actors were using buttons of a standard 
keyboard, which provided sensory cues about the other’s contin-
uous presence and responses. Experiment 3 aimed to assess the 
contribution from this auditory information by having pairs of 
seeing and blindfolded participants working either with a standard 
keyboard that did provide auditory feedback or with a noise-free 
keyboard that did not. If online auditory action-related feedback 
from the co-actor would play a role, the SSE should be reduced 
or disappear with a noise-free keyboard. Alternatively, if a priori 
dIscussIon
The outcome of Experiment 1 is straightforward: a Simon effect 
was obtained both in the standard and in the joint-action condition 
but not in the single condition. This replicates the basic findings of 
Sebanz et al. (2003) and extends it to auditory stimuli (in accord-
ance with Ruys and Aarts, 2010).
ExpErImEnt 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to eliminate visual action-related infor-
mation about the co-actor without changing any other aspect of the 
experimental task, the context, and the instruction. We did that by 
having all participants wear goggles that in one group of participants 
were translucent, which would basically put them into the same situ-
ation as the participants of Experiment 1, but that in another group 
of participants were opaque. Thus, in this group, no visual online 
information was available, even though the participants were aware 
of the presence of their co-actor and heard him/her carry out the task. 
If visual online information would be relevant for the participant’s 
continuous grounding of the task representation, the SSE should be 
weaker or absent in the blindfolded group. Alternatively, if a priori 
knowledge (offline information) is sufficient to establish the SSE, 
while online information is merely redundant, then we should find 
no reduction of the SSE in the blindfolded group.
mEthod
Forty-two participants (18 male), aged 18- to 30-years old (average 
age: 23.19), were selected according to the same criteria applied in 
Experiment 1. Each participant received 7.50 €. One pair of subjects 
violated the instructions not to talk during the experiment and 
their data were removed from analyses. The method was the same 
as in Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. Participants in 
the seeing group wore see-through glasses while participants in the 
blindfolded group wore opaque glasses (see Figure 3).
A Joint Go/No-Go task similar to the Joint condition of Experiment 
1 was used. The task employed a 2 (Go/No-Go) × 2 (congruent, 
incongruent) × 2 (visual information present or absent) factorial 
design. Participants were presented with a feedback screen after half 
of the trials, blindfolded subjects were allowed to take off their goggles 
to see it. The task consisted of 128 trials per cell for each participant 
(in total 512 trials were presented). It was preceded by a training phase 
of 25 trials per cell (during the training phase the participants in the 
blindfolded condition were already blindfolded). Participants were 
instructed not to talk to each other during the experiment.
rEsults
The error rate was again very low (1.2%). Median RTs for cor-
rect responses were entered into a two-way mixed ANOVA, with 
the independent variable Congruency (congruent, incongruent) 
Table 1 | experiment 1, mean rTs and Simon effect for the three 
conditions.
 Congruent incongruent Simon effect
Single 323 321 −2
Joint 302 315 13
Standard 311 353 42
Figure 3 | goggles used in the blindfolded (see left participant) and 
seeing conditions (see right participant).
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conclusIons
The main aim of our study was to investigate the contribution of 
online visual and auditory information about a co-actor to the 
SSE. The very existence of the SSE suggests that action and task 
representations are grounded in the current situational context 
and consider cues about the presence and activities of co-actors. 
However, our present findings suggest that this grounding does 
not need to be continuous, in the sense that these representations 
can survive in the absence of ongoing visual and auditory feed-
back. After having established our auditory version of the social 
Simon task in Experiment 1 and replicated the basic findings 
reported by Sebanz et al. (2003), we tested the contribution of 
visual feedback from the other in Experiment 2 and the contribu-
tion of auditory feedback about the other’s actions in Experiment 
3. Even though our manipulation of auditory feedback does not 
rule out task-unrelated feedback from the co-actor, such as breath-
ing noises or coughs, participants in the no-visual/no-auditory 
condition of Experiment 3 did not have any sensory cues about 
the action being performed by the other. And yet, a full-blown 
SSE was obtained.
What matters for the SSE does not seem to be online informa-
tion about the social situation but the mere knowledge that a 
social, intentional co-actor is present. This conclusion does not 
support the concept of co-representation suggested by Sebanz 
et al. (2003). If the SSE would emerge at a representational level 
that does not distinguish between one’s own actions and the 
actions of another person, and if that representational level 
would be fed by sensory feedback about both types of actions, one 
would expect the SSE to strongly rely on more or less continuous 
sensory action feedback. Eliminating this feedback should thus 
eliminate the SSE, which is not what our present findings show. 
Instead, what seems to matter is apparently the actor’s belief that 
he/she is interacting with an intentional agent (Tsai and Brass, 
2007), which is likely to rely on a priori knowledge about the 
intentional co-actor.
Hence, top-down effects (Liepelt and Brass, 2010) seem to be 
much more central to the SSE than previously thought. Top-down 
modulation may be even more important in the SSE than, for exam-
ple, in automatic imitation research, where taking away the actor’s 
intention reduces but does not eliminate stimulus–response prim-
ing (Liepelt et al., 2008).
This is likely to explain why the SSE is eliminated if the actor 
is led to believe to interact with an un-intentional agent (Tsai 
and Brass, 2007). It also provides some pointers to why Tsai et al. 
(2008) were able to produce an SSE but Welsh et al. (2007) were 
not. As discussed already, the participants of Tsai et al., but not 
knowledge (offline information) is sufficient to establish the SSE, 
then we should find no reduction of the SSE when eliminating 
visual and auditory online information.
mEthod
Forty participants (18 male), aged 18- to 30-years old (average 
age: 23.14), were selected according to the same criteria as in 
Experiment 1. The method was as in Experiment 2, with the fol-
lowing exceptions. In addition to the manipulation of the visual 
feedback between participants, the presence of auditory feedback 
(present, absent) was manipulated within participants. Each 
participant performed one block with a standard keyboard and 
another block with a noise-free keyboard, with the order being 
balanced across participants. To shorten the experiment, the length 
of each trial was reduced to a maximum of 2000 ms. Each par-
ticipant worked through 32 trials per cell, 256 trials in total. The 
task was preceded by a training phase of eight trials, two per cell, 
during which the participants in the blindfold condition were 
again already blindfolded.
rEsults
The error rate was again very low (0.8%). Median RTs for cor-
rect responses were entered into a three-way mixed ANOVA, with 
Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) and Auditory Feedback 
(present, absent) as within-subjects factors and Visual Feedback 
(present, absent) as between-subjects factor. There was a main effect 
of Congruency (F(1,38) = 40.99, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.52); Responses 
were slower in incongruent than in congruent trials (M = 375, 
SE = 12.5, and M = 355, SE = 11.7 respectively). There was neither 
a main effect of Visual Feedback (F(1,38) = 2.84, p = 0.1, η2 = 0.07), 
nor of Auditory Feedback (F(1,38) = 2.52, p = 0.12, η2 = 0.06), nor 
any significant interaction. The average Simon effect was similar for 
participants with both auditory and visual feedback (25 ms) and 
the participants without any feedback (26 ms; Table 3).
dIscussIon
Despite having no online feedback about the other’s actions, par-
ticipants showed a full-blown SSE and there was not even a sign 
of a reduction of the effect in the absence of visual and auditory 
feedback. The only peculiarity in the numerical data pattern is the 
rather small effect in the condition with auditory but without visual 
feedback. However, given that, in Experiment 2, the same condi-
tion yielded a full-blown SSE comparable to the other conditions 
in Experiment 3, we consider this an accidental observation of no 
theoretical relevance. In any case, it seems clear that online visual 
or auditory feedback from the other is not required for the SSE to 
occur. Instead, the present findings suggest a central role of a priori 
knowledge (offline information) and the belief to interact with a 
social, intentional agent (Tsai and Brass, 2007) for the SSE.
Table 2 | experiment 2, mean rTs and Simon effect for the two 
conditions.
Visual feedback Congruent incongruent Simon effect
Present 283 303 20
Absent  285 309 24
Table 3 | experiment 3, mean rTs and Simon effects as a function of 
visual and auditory feedback.
Auditory Visual Congruent incongruent Simon 
feedback feedback   effect
Present Present 325 350 25
 Absent 374 382 8
Absent Present 342 362 20
 Absent 379 405 26
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of Welsh et al., were repeatedly updated about the presence of 
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To summarize, we show that task representations can be 
grounded in offline information, but the contradictory findings 
between Welsh et al. (2007) and Tsai et al. (2008) remind us that this 
offline information may be kept active for only a limited amount of 
time. Note that our setup did not prevent participants from seeing 
and talking to each other upon arrival, before the actual experi-
ment began, and it might be that experience (or the memory of it) 
